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Abstract 
This presentation discusses a notion encountered across 
disciplines, and in different facets of human activity: 
autonomous activity. We engage it in an interdisciplinary 
way. We start by considering the reactions and behaviors of 
biological entities to biotechnological intervention. An 
attempt is made to characterize the degree of freedom of 
embryos & clones, which show openness to different 
outcomes when the epigenetic developmental landscape is 
factored in. We then consider the claim made in 
programming and artificial intelligence that automata could 
show self-directed behavior as to the determination of their 
step-wise decisions on courses of action. This question 
remains largely open and calls for some important 
qualifications. We try to make sense of the presence of 
claims of freedom in agency, first in common sense, then 
by ascribing developmental plasticity in biology and 
biotechnology, and in the mapping of programmed systems 
in the presence of environmental cues and self-referenced 
circuits as well as environmental coupling. This is the 
occasion to recall attempts at working out a logical and 
methodological approach to the openness of concepts that 
are still to be found, and assess whether they can operate 
the structuring intelligibility of a yet undeveloped or under-
developed field of study, where a “bisociation" and a 
unification of knowledge might be possible. 
Keywords: Autonomy, Biotechnology, Artificial 
intelligence, abductive inference, behavior, development, 
individuation. 
1. Introduction 
One can encounter the concept of autonomy as one that 
functions in different areas of human thought and activity: 
in psychology and more largely the social sciences, when 
dealing for instance with education; in technology as some 
apparatuses are rendered capable of remaining independent 
from their users for more and more tasks; and finally in the 
natural sciences where living beings display different forms 
of autonomous processes. We will consider different uses 
of autonomy in Biology (section 2), Cognitive Science and 
Artificial Intelligence (section 3), and suggest that there is 
not a unique coherent definition of autonomy at play in 
these different contexts. This matter of fact raises multiples 
epistemological and methodological issues that will be 
discussed in a third part (section 4). It is important to stress 
that we will not in this discussion make attempts at 
addressing directly the idea of moral autonomy, but that we 
will restrict ourselves to a discussion of the acquisition of 
autonomy as a mode of independence of an entity (living 
being, artificial system, robot) when performing a set of 
non-directed tasks. 
2. Autonomy in the Life Sciences and Biotechnology 
The phenomenon of organic stabilization of conditions 
between the organism and its environment has been noted 
by researchers for a long time, and was tentatively defined, 
through the concept of ‘homeostatis,’ as a broad 
maintenance of a stable internal environment–which 
Claude Bernard termed “the internal milieu”–in coupling 
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with an external environment that fluctuates [2]. The 
French physiologist and statistician Pierre Vendryès 
extended the work of Claude Bernard on this ‘internal 
milieu,’ and as such distinguished three levels in the 
acquisition of autonomy: the metabolic, the motor, and the 
mental. Those also represent three stages in evolution, with 
the motor autonomy using the metabolic, and the mental 
autonomy using the motor. The closure theorized by 
Vendryès speaking, already in 1942, of the living being as 
its own reference system [9:52; see synthesis in 28:37-70] 
was unwittingly followed by the approach of Maturana and 
Varela who proposed to define biological autonomy by its 
self-referenced organization, also called autopoiesis [17, 
20]. Biological organisms possess a capacity as individuals, 
whether at the cellular or pluricellular levels, to act and 
become in space and time relative to their own 
organization, through unfolding of capacities to produce 
this structure, that are sometimes triggered according to 
their encounters with many environmental factors. From 
this point of view, any alteration to living organisms, 
including biotechnological intervention, could be limited 
by their relative impact on the systems’ capacity to 
maintain its operating self-organization. 
Yet, the biotechnological advances, especially as they 
pertain to cloning, present a challenge to this acquisition of 
biological autonomy, and to any idea of ‘self’-adjusted 
internal factors creating adaptive conditions to be coupled 
to an external environment. They seem to call for a 
relational process, and also for epigenetic adaptiveness. 
C. H. Waddington broke a trend when he suggested an 
‘epigenetic landscape’ as a visualization of the interaction 
between genes and the environment, and then attempted to 
model the developmental pathways a cell can take during 
differentiation, to finally feel the need to include in his 
model concepts such as regulation, competence, and 
induction [31]. 
Within experimentation in biotechnological modification of 
organisms, one has to assess whether there isn't a form of 
limitation on the side of the experimenter that would be the 
flipside of a variation on autonomy in such living entities. 
This might be the reason why attempts at cloning stem 
cells, or somatic adult cells, do not always deliver the 
expected outcome and why cloned animals display so 
many abnormalities during development [5]. Cloning by 
embryonic or somatic cell nuclear transfer has produced 
new animals which display a constitutive frailty stemming 
from both their creation mode and their developmental 
process. This questions the contribution of reproduction 
technologies in the becoming of such entities and, more 
generally, calls for a constructive influence of the 
environment–in a broad sense including technical 
interference–on natural developmental processes. This 
could also explain why human in vitro fertilized newborns 
display abnormalities at birth [4]. One is led to consider 
whether natural entities would have their own ‘norm of 
development,’ and whether this developmental autonomy 
would be set against constraints that come from the 
environment and that could be simulated in experimental 
protocols. 
Epigenetics, which studies environments’ impacts on 
developmental pathways, brings a new explanatory 
framework that can be added to the genetic one in order to 
fill the gaps within the biological significance of autonomy. 
Consequently, a corollary to this notion of autonomy as 
self-organization comes from the fact that biological 
entities have variable and metastable epigenetic profiles of 
possible becomings, and as such their biological autonomy 
is expressed as a form of plasticity [19]. Biological 
individuals are not only autonomous but plastic as their 
biological individuality is not yet determined but will be 
constructed in response and sometimes against internal or 
external constraints. Thanks to environmental influence 
and behavioral autonomy, epigenetic individuals possess a 
freedom of becoming [8] and therefore a biological 
autonomy dependent on the fulfilling of certain relations. 
3. Autonomy in Artificial Intelligence 
and Cognitive Science 
The notion of autonomy is also mobilized under various 
forms in AI and the cognitive sciences. In the field of 
Artificial Life and related fields of cognitive science where 
the concept of autonomy has been used in empirical 
research, a unique definition is far from being consensual, 
though common grounds between definitions exist [3]. This 
shows that such a fundamental notion is useful to 
characterize certain essential aspects or developments of 
artificial systems and that its use has pushed for a more 
thorough examination of heuristic concepts to widen their 
applicability. One way this has been achieved is by creating 
the distinction between levels or dimensions of the initial 
central concept of autonomy from which a living or 
artificial system is being characterized [11, 30]. Though 
artificial agents lack constitutive autonomy, because they 
don’t self-determine their organization and structure, by 
achieving learning processes in a more self-developed 
manner they can achieve higher degrees of behavioral 
autonomy. 
Recently, some researchers in programming, automation 
and artificial intelligence have asked the question whether 
it would be possible for automata to self-direct, and 
whether or not they could acquire a form of autonomy [12, 
13], with an inspiration partly found in constructivism [see 
18: 875]. This would partly withdraw those experimental 
entities from the realm of obedience to programming, as 
submitted to some atemporal logical or algorithmic 
framework, and launch them into the realm of becoming. If 
they truly have something akin to autonomy in their 
constitution, they could modify their own structure through 
a change in the program that specifies it, or ‘codes’ for it in 
the language of the geneticist. These modifications are low-
level features that might evolve in time under local 
environmental influences by using a recollection of 
machine-environment interactions. 
4. Analysis of the interdisciplinary 
landscape about autonomy 
In light of the different definitions of autonomy exposed in 
the previous sections, it appears that there is no unique 
clarified meaning for this term that is mobilized in the 
different studied contexts. Rather, divergences and 
mismatches seem to occur. 
Questions arise about the extent to which biological 
concepts can be meaningfully transferred to artificial 
intelligence, and even more so, become fruitful. Are 
researchers merely adopting a conventionalist strategy [24], 
or do they speak about autonomy in a strongly semantic 
sense, as it would relate to more entrenched uses such in 
biology? 
Connections between the different uses of the notion of 
autonomy may be of different types. In AI research, the 
concept of autonomy is used to define a research project 
which intends to develop systems that bear the faculty to 
self-construct and self-determine a goal to be ultimately 
followed, with the associated fecundity it can bring for the 
related fields. Yet researchers know autonomy is not only a 
project but has different facets in common sense and 
metaphors. 
There is indeed the recognition in the disciplinary context 
of something usually linked to autonomy in common sense. 
As such, we have here a case where we find in 
biotechnologies and in artificial intelligence research, the 
convergence of a theme and a vocabulary that overlaps 
around the idea of autonomy, whether it be in terms of the 
attempts to understand what programmed features map the 
acquisition of autonomy or the possibility of self-
programming. These concepts were used in the context of 
cybernetics, and posterior developments on self-organized 
biological systems, to map the behavior of feedback-
control systems–machine and animal–thinking them 
alongside each other in an analogical way. 
The conceptual bridges force on us the use of metaphors. 
Developmental maps, and notions like the epigenetic 
landscape, have been dubbed ‘problematic metaphors’ [32: 
13-16], but can we think that this problematic character is 
the flipside of a still unexploited heuristic fruitfulness 
beyond the multifariousness with which we are presently 
groping? Another metaphor which has shown a clear 
heuristic value across fields, between computer science and 
neuroscience, is the analogy between the nervous system’s 
operation and a computer’s, that of processing information 
through circuits. Though recognizing the clear distinction 
between these two systems, especially regarding their 
physical structure and organization, neuroscience research 
has built its fundamental knowledge of the system’s 
operation on this conceptual bridge. 
Researchers acknowledge that artificial agents’ autonomy 
is probably not reachable as we find in the autonomy of 
living beings, but the fact is that observers can see the face 
of autonomy anyway, as if they were discovering facets of 
the idea as informally and indexically recognized in 
common sense. These facets of autonomy, as particulars, 
could be recognized as belonging to the comprehension of 
defined concepts in each fields and domains and allow the 
researcher to make ‘determinative’ judgments in a sense we 
will develop further down. This analogy is operating for 
example in the comparison between recursivity and 
iterativity. Barandiaran and Moreno compare the 
recursivity characteristic of autopoiesis in living models 
and the iterative aspects in artificial models, and they look 
there for a common logic that takes into account historical 
and structural/organizational features [1]. 
But the judgment can also be made the other way around 
and use particulars to enlighten the overall understanding 
independently of the given fields. This analogy is operating 
for example when looking for the general principle 
widening the scope of the relational aspect of autonomy. 
Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno call for the existence of a general 
principle explaining the open-ended redefinition of 
autonomous systems thanks to the relative dynamic 
decoupling among distinct parts, modules or modes of 
operation in these systems, as we recognize the need for 
differentiated parts to maintain the system’s organization 
and allow homeostasis [25]. Thanks to an analogical and 
interdisciplinary use of concepts, the authors suggest that 
by decoupling their operational modes and structures or by 
widening the space of possible actions while still coupling 
them with the environment, systems–whether alive or 
artificial– might acquire autonomy. 
Yet, do we observe a flexibility of in the use of such 
acquired autonomy in AI? The answer is a list of criteria to 
say that an agent is more or less autonomous. This list of 
criteria for the acquisition of autonomy starts from 
behavioral autonomy and continues with developmental 
learning and individuation. Constitutive autonomy would 
be an ultimate goal to reach [7, 10]. 
As neglected interactive aspects stemming from autonomy 
should be equally addressed, we prefer to talk about 
‘developmental autonomy.’ Piaget thought that 
development is the process of establishing and enlarging 
the space of possible actions that the system can engage in 
while still maintaining the consistency of the coupling with 
the environment [29]. But a distinction must be made 
between the researchers’ objective and the targets of the 
artificial system. Recent studies therefore suggest to 
generate ‘non target-directed behaviors’ for an artificial 
system ‘in an unknown environment’ [13, 21]. Doing so, 
authors expect to observe a developmental individuation–
when the entity explores an unknown environment–that 
could be considered more relational and thus more 
autonomous than a usual machine-learning individuation. 
Nevertheless, this developmental individuation is not close 
to living being’s individuation in that it cannot reach 
agency, because of the lack of a capacity of regulating its 
coupling with the environment (interactional asymmetry) 
and, most of all, in virtue of its lacking a capacity of 
creating its own rules, or necessities, of interaction 
(normativity) [7]. 
There could be an acquisition of autonomy when we have 
an agent exploring possibilities of interaction. But what 
learner or ‘acquirer’ of information should we compare it 
with? Only a mode of mapping allowing to analogize with 
less autonomous processes could, it seems, put us on the 
trace of the ‘Gestalt’ of autonomy. 
· Living being individuation / crystal individuation 
· Developmental individuation / usual machine 
learning individuation 
These particulars can be associated in an ascending 
reflective judgment as all putatively belonging to the 
comprehension of ‘autonomous’ as grasped in common 
sense (together with other particulars recognized as 
belonging to this common sense comprehension). 
Finally in AI research, the concept of autonomy is used to 
define a research project which intends to develop systems 
that bear the faculty to self-construct and self-determine a 
goal to follow ultimately, with the associated fecundity it 
can bring for the related fields. 
All these uses, metaphors, analogies, subcategories of the 
same word ‘autonomy’ carry methodological interest for 
interdisciplinary research. Methodological questions 
addressing such interdisciplinary translation of concepts 
will explore whether concepts can be transferred and still 
operate in a new field, or how it is possible for a concept to 
be the same when associated with different definitions in 
different fields. 
As we hinted, one hypothesis could be that the transfer 
operates through a switch between the ‘determinative’ and 
the ‘reflective’ modes of judgment. We mean that a 
‘determinative judgement’ in one field could be an 
occasion for a ‘reflective judgement’ in another, and 
therefore give birth to novelty in this second field. Kant 
termed ‘determinative’ the judgment which placed the 
particular or singular under a universal, while he termed 
‘reflective’ the judgment where the particular is given, and 
one has to find the universal, or the general rule, under 
which to place it [15: intro §IV, 15-16]. This insight 
favorably prepares Peirce’s abductive views since, in the 
case of the living, Kant saw that its singular response, 
facing mechanical modeling forced on it from outside, 
might require from the experimenter to try to see if there 
would not be a greater fruitfulness in adopting the 
hypothesis of a causation by a final state [27: 271-288]. 
5. Conclusion: Open Remarks on Creativity 
Thanks to an analogical transposition and translation of 
concepts, finding a logic of emergence of ideas is possible. 
In such a case, interdisciplinarity acts as the breeding 
ground of the abduction process where intuition captures 
the interlocking of two fields with no need of knowing the 
fields’ structure and content. Peirce had observed that logic 
does not furnish us with new knowledge, because it does 
not speak of the relationship to the world but rather of 
relationships between terms and propositions, and he 
theorized that, for this very reason, there must be a capacity 
possessed by the mind which enables it not only to guess 
right, but to invite reality itself to take part in the process of 
inventing a scheme which will then be used to think this 
same reality adequately, and he went as far as holding that 
something in nature already ‘syllogizes’ before the human 
mind can start the questioning of the pathway it has 
followed [22: 175, 23]. It would be a step which, taking 
part in the logical progression of thought, would 
nevertheless contain a synthetic element, reconciling the 
intelligible and the empirical. 
This could also be performed through the passage at a level 
where the concept is larger than what is targeted in a given 
discipline, with an open texture as happens very often in 
what we call common sense. If we were justified in so 
doing, we could see the metaphor, in line with its definition 
by Max Black, as a case of ‘construing as.’ In other words, 
thanks to the ‘family resemblances’ brought about by 
interdisciplinarity we would see an intuition able to detect a 
possible fruitfulness in another field, with the use of a 
concept that has been foundational in one field to see 
whether it could create new avenues for thought in another 
field.  
But one question still remains: how can we be sure that this 
exploration of analogies and this creation of meaning still 
cope with reality? The process of discovery remains an 
enigmatic one. Arthur Koestler claimed that with the 
occurrence of invention there was a ‘bisociation of 
matrices,’ [16] and the interesting question is whether we 
can think its conditions of possibility. We know that 
abductive inference can rest upon a more common use of a 
concept in one field to search for its application and 
fruitfulness in another, by inventing a connection between 
the two that remains to be substantiated in its degree of 
certainty and provability: a “matter-of-factness” from an 
hypothesized law of principle [6: 8-9]. 
In order to answer Peirce’s question about how human 
understanding may choose among possibilities the very one 
that copes with reality, we propose that the condition of 
possibility of an intuition able to detect a possible 
fruitfulness in another field is the testimony of the process 
of individuation of life and intelligence which is a process 
on the same kind as the one explored by Gilbert Simondon 
[26]. Because natural life and human thinking follow the 
same individuation process, analogies between biology and 
artificial intelligence can be legitimized. We suggest this 
common individuation process in reality is the foundation 
of the relation between analogical and logical thinking and 
that it can overtake the human determination of frontiers of 
species and disciplines. 
6. References 
[1] Barandiaran, X. & Moreno, A., “Adaptivity: From 
Metabolism to Behavior”, Adaptive Behavior in 
Biological Systems and Autonomous Artificial Systems, 
Vol. 16, No. 5, 2008, pp. 325-344. 
[2] Bernard, C., “Leçon d'ouverture, 9 décembre 1857” in 
Leçons sur les propriétés physiologiques et les 
altérations pathologiques des liquides de l’organisme, 
Paris: J. B. Baillière & fils, 1859, Vol I.	
[3] Boden, M.A. “Autonomy: what is it?”, Biosystems, 
No. 91, 2008, pp. 305-308. 
[4] Chen M. & Heilbronn L.K., “The health outcomes of 
human offspring conceived by assisted reproductive 
technologies (ART)”, Journal of Developmental Origins 
of Health and Disease, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2017, pp. 388-402. 
[5] Constant, F., Guillomot, M., Heyman, Y., Vignon, X., 
Laigre, P., Servely, J.-L., Renard, J.-P., & Chavatte-Palmer, 
P., “Large offspring or large placenta syndrome? 
Morphometric analysis of late gestation bovine 
placentomes from somatic nuclear transfer pregnancies 
complicated by hydrallantois”, Biology of Reproduction, 
Vol. 75, No. 1, 2006, pp. 122-30. 
[6] Deladalle, G., Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of 
Signs, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. 
[7] Di Paolo, E. A., “Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology, 
agency”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 
No. 4, 2005, pp. 429-452. 
[8] Exbrayat, J.-M. & Montera, B. de, "L'approche du 
biologiste: l'homme et les êtres biologiques face à leur 
liberté", in Personne et Liberté: de la biologie au droit. 
État des lieux d’une connexion, Copain-Héritier, C. 
& Longère, F. (eds.), Bayonne: Institut Francophone pour 
la Justice et la Démocratie, series "Colloques et Essais", 
2019, pp. 43-63. 
[9] François, C., International Encyclopedia of Systems 
and Cybernetics, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2011. 
[10] Froese, T. & Ziemke, T., “Enactive artificial 
intelligence: Investigating the systemic organization of life 
and mind”, Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 173, Nos. 3-4, 
2009, pp. 466-500. 
[11] Froese, T., Virgo, N., & Izquierdo, E., “Autonomy: a 
review and a reappraisal,” in Proceedings of the 9th 
European Conference on Artificial Life: Advances in 
Artificial Life, Almeida e Costa, F. (ed.), Vol. 4648, 2007. 
[12] Georgeon, O., Robertson, P., & Xue, J., “Generating 
natural behaviors using constructivist algorithms’, JMLR: 
Workshop and Conference proceedings, 2020, 1: pp. 1-9. 
[13] Georgeon, O. & Riegler, A., “CASH only: 
Constitutive autonomy through motorsensory self-
programming,” Cognitive Systems Research, No. 58, 
2019, pp. 366-374. 
[14] Georgeon, O. & Guillermin, M., “Mastering the Laws 
of Feedback Contingencies Is Essential to Constructivist 
Artificial Agents”, Constructivist Foundations, Vol. 13, 
No. 2, 2018, pp. 300-301. 
[15] Kant, I., Critique of Judgment, trans J. C. Meredith, 
N. Walker (ed.), Oxford/New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007. 
[16] Koestler, A., The Act of Creation, London: 
Hutchinson & Co. 
[17] Maturana, H. & Varela, F., Autopoiesis and 
Cognition: The Realization of the Living, Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic, 1980. 
[18] Meyers, R. (ed.), Encyclopedia of Complexity and 
Systems Science, Dordrecht: Springer, 2009. 
[19] Montera, B. de, El Zehery, D., Müller, S., Jammes, H., 
Brem, G., Reichenbach, H.-D., Scheipl, F., Chavatte-
Palmer, P., Zakhartchenko, V., Schmitz, O.J., Wolf, E., 
Renard, J.-P., & Hiendleder, S., "Quantification of 
Leukocyte genomic 5- Methylcytosine levels reveals 
Epigenetic Plasticity in Healthy Adult Cloned Cattle", 
Cellular Reprogramming, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2010: 
pp. 175-181. 
[20] Moreno, A. & Mossio, M., Biological Autonomy: A 
Philosophical and Theoretical Enquiry, Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2015. 
[21] Nogueira, Y. L. B., Brito, C. E. F. de, Vidal, C. A., & 
Canvalcante-Neto, J. B., “Towards intrinsic autonomy 
through evolutionary computation”, Artificial Intelligence 
Review, 2019, online Dec 17. 
[22] Peirce, C. S., “The Dispute between Nominalists and 
Realists,” in Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected 
Writings, M. Moore (ed.), Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2010, p. 175f.. 
[23] Peirce, C. S., Reasoning and the Logic of Things, K. 
L. Letner (ed.), Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1992. 
[24] Putnam, H., "The refutation of conventionalism" in 
Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers 2, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 [1975], 
pp. 153-191. 
[25] Ruiz-Mirazo, K. & Moreno, A., “Autonomy in 
evolution. From minimal to complex life”, Synthese, Vol.
185, No. 1, pp. 21–52. 
[26] Simondon, G., L’individu et sa genèse physico-
biologique, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1964 
(re-issued as L'individuation à la lumière des notions de 
forme et d’information, Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 2013). 
[27] Vaihinger, H., The Philosophy of ‘As If’, trans. C. K. 
Ogden, London: Routledge, 2000 (1924). 
[28] Vendryès, P., L’autonomie du vivant, Paris: Maloine, 
1981. 
[29] Vernon, D., “Reconciling Constitutive and 
Behavioural Autonomy. The Challenge of Modelling 
Development in Enactive Cognition”, Intellectica, Vol. 65, 
No. 1, 2016, pp. 63-79. 
[30] Vernon, D., Lowe, R., Thill, S., & Ziemke T., 
“Embodied cognition and circular causality: on the role of 
constitutive autonomy in the reciprocal coupling of 
perception and action.” Frontiers in Psychology, No. 6, 
2015, p. 1660. 
[31] Waddington, C. H., The Strategy of the Genes, 
London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957. 
[32] West-Eberhard, M. J., Developmental Plasticity and 
Evolution, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003. 
